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Abstract
Models of cultural evolution study how the distribution of cultural traits changes over time. The dynamics of cultural
evolution strongly depends on the way these traits are transmitted between individuals by social learning. Two prominent
forms of social learning are payoff-based learning (imitating others that have higher payoffs) and conformist learning
(imitating locally common behaviours). How payoff-based and conformist learning affect the cultural evolution of
cooperation is currently a matter of lively debate, but few studies systematically analyse the interplay of these forms of
social learning. Here we perform such a study by investigating how the interaction of payoff-based and conformist learning
affects the outcome of cultural evolution in three social contexts. First, we develop a simple argument that provides insights
into how the outcome of cultural evolution will change when more and more conformist learning is added to payoff-based
learning. In a social dilemma (e.g. a Prisoner’s Dilemma), conformism can turn cooperation into a stable equilibrium; in an
evasion game (e.g. a Hawk-Dove game or a Snowdrift game) conformism tends to destabilize the polymorphic equilibrium;
and in a coordination game (e.g. a Stag Hunt game), conformism changes the basin of attraction of the two equilibria.
Second, we analyse a stochastic event-based model, revealing that conformism increases the speed of cultural evolution
towards pure equilibria. Individual-based simulations as well as the analysis of the diffusion approximation of the stochastic
model by and large confirm our findings. Third, we investigate the effect of an increasing degree of conformism on cultural
group selection in a group-structured population. We conclude that, in contrast to statements in the literature, conformism
hinders rather than promotes the evolution of cooperation.
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Introduction
Social learning enables humans to survive in a broad array of
different habitats across the planet. By learning from their peers,
individuals can rapidly acquire adaptive information about which
behaviour is optimal under a variety of environmental conditions.
Models of cultural evolution use insights from theories of genetic
evolution to study how cultural variants, such as ideas and beliefs,
spread through populations of individuals by social learning.
Social learning based on imitating the behaviour of successful
individuals can lead to an evolutionary dynamic similar to the
spread of alleles under natural selection, whereas learning by
adopting behaviours from others more randomly leads to a process
resembling genetic drift.
Models of cultural evolution have to be adapted to the specific
mechanisms by which cultural traits transmit between individuals.
Traits can be transmitted not only vertically from parents to
offspring, but in a range of different ways. For instance, traditional
hunters may learn from their parents a social norm to share
hunting revenues, and may learn the optimal design of an arrow
from their fellow hunters. How humans learn from each other is a
topic of extensive theoretical and empirical research (for a recent
overview see [1]), and various specific forms of social learning
(termed ‘social learning strategies’ [2] or ‘learning biases’ [3]) have
been studied as to how they affect the spread of cultural traits
through populations. Two forms of social learning received
particular attention: conformism and payoff-based learning.
When individuals can evaluate the payoffs of the behavioural
strategies of others, the preferential imitation of high-payoff
individuals can lead to the rapid spread of adaptive behaviours in a
population [4]. However, such payoff-based learning is not always
feasible. Getting insights in the payoffs received by others is not
always straightforward, especially for newcomers in a population.
In cases like this, imitating the majority (conformism) can be a
good alternative form of social learning, in particular if the success
of cultural traits strongly depends on the local circumstances [3,5].
The role of conformism in cultural evolution has recently
become the matter of considerable debate. In the context of a
social dilemma, payoff-based learning will tend to inhibit the
spread of cooperation because defectors obtain higher payoffs by
reaping the benefits of cooperation without paying the costs.
Theory suggest that when payoff-based learning is complemented
by other forms of social learning, the dynamics of cultural
evolution can be strongly affected. For instance, adding random
learning to payoff-based learning can facilitate the rapid solution
of coordination problems [6], and conformism can stabilise
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cooperative equilibria under specific conditions [3,7–14]. More-
over, conformism can homogenise groups internally, thereby
augmenting the relative amount of variation between groups [14].
This decreases the scope for selection within groups (i.e. payoff-
based transmission disfavouring cooperation), and increases the
potential role of ‘cultural group selection’. In group-structured
populations, cooperation can spread when groups of cooperators
have some advantage over groups of defectors. This advantage can
manifest itself in a number of different ways; cooperative groups
may send out more migrants, grow to larger sizes, or replace other
groups (e.g. [8,15–17]). Selection at the group level may also occur
when individuals occasionally learn from members of other groups
that perform better[4,18–20]. Through such a process, coopera-
tion can be promoted since individuals in cooperative groups have
higher payoffs than individuals in groups of non-cooperators.
Experiments from psychology and behavioural economics
suggest that humans indeed use both conformist and payoff-based
learning in determining their behaviour [21–24]. When individ-
uals are allowed to use both conformist and payoff-based learning,
experimental evidence suggests that cultural traits can spread
through a mixture of these two forms of social learning [23,25,26].
This raises the question of how the interplay of conformist and
payoff-based learning affects the spread of cultural traits through a
population.
First, we develop a simple argument to delineate how the
direction of cultural change is affected by the relative rate of
conformist and payoff-based learning. This will give us an intuitive
insight in the effects of conformism in various contexts of social
interaction. Second, we construct stochastic models that allow us
to follow the spread of culturally transmitted behaviours in the
course of time in a finite population. These models allow us to
quantify how the relative degree of conformism (as opposed to
payoff-based learning) affects the success of social strategies in
reaching fixation. Third, we examine how cooperation can spread
in a group-structured population by means of cultural group
selection. With this model, we investigate whether conformism
tends to promote – as often claimed in the literature – or hamper
the spread of cooperation in populations that are structured into
groups of finite size.
Analysis and Results
1. Model Structure
We consider a population in which individuals are involved in
social interactions. Individuals have a culturally acquired strategy
that determines their behaviour in these interactions. We consider
two variants of this behaviour (A or B). An individual has the
inclination of playing either A or B, but this inclination can change
over the course of time due to social learning. Learning is either
based on payoffs (individuals tend to imitate successful individuals)
or on conformism (individuals tend to imitate the majority of the
population). The relative frequency c of these two forms of social
learning is the key parameter of interest. The value of c ranges
from 0 to 1. If c= 0, all learning is payoff-based; if c= 1, all
learning is based on conformism. If 0, c ,1, individuals use a
mixture of these two forms of social learning. We assume that all
individuals use the same mixture of conformist and payoff-based
learning.
Individuals acquire payoffs by social interaction with others in
their group. Payoffs depend linearly on the frequency p of A-





: The payoff of A-individuals is
pA~p:az(1{p):b ð1aÞ
and the payoff of B-individuals is
pB~p:cz(1{p):d: ð1bÞ
There are three strategically different classes of games with two
pure strategies, and we consider the evolutionary dynamics in each
of these ‘interaction contexts’. In the first class of games, one of the
pure strategies (say B) is dominant over the other: avc and bvd.
In the special case where awd, this is a social dilemma. Collective
interests are opposed to individual interests: when all individuals
exhibit behaviour A (‘cooperate’), payoffs are higher than when all
individuals exhibit behaviour B (‘defect’). Individually, however, B
yields higher payoffs than A, irrespective of what others are doing.
Second, we consider the class of coordination games, which are
characterized by awc and bvd. In this case, the payoff of a pure
strategy increases with the number of individuals using this
strategy. In a coordination game, both pure strategies are Nash
equilibrium strategies. In addition, there is a (dynamically




Third, we consider the class of evasion games, where avc and
bwd . Now the relative payoff of each pure strategy decreases with
the frequency of this strategy in the population. In an evasion
game, none of the pure strategies is a Nash equilibrium; instead an
evasion game has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, which is
given by eq. (2). The Hawk-Dove game and the Snowdrift game
are prominent examples of evasion games.
2. Representation of Conformism by a Coordination
Game
Before studying the dynamics of cultural evolution in finite
populations, we aim to get some intuition on how conformism
might change the direction of cultural evolution. To this end, we
represent conformism-based learning by payoff-based learning in





coordination game, the payoff to each pure strategy is proportional
to its frequency in the population: pA~p:s and pB~(1{p):s,
where s is positive. Accordingly, the pure strategy with highest
frequency is favoured by payoff-based learning, just as it is in case
of conformism-based learning. Based on these considerations, a
mixture of payoff-based learning (characterised by matrix G) and
conformist learning (characterised by matrix K) can be described






It is now straightforward to characterise the expected direction
of cultural change as a function of our key parameter c by
determining the Nash equilibrium strategies of the matrix game
M(c). This can be done with standard methods [27]: Pure strategy
A is a Nash equilibrium if (1{c)azcsw(1{c)c or equivalently
Conformism & the Cultural Evolution of Cooperation
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swb{d: Both inequalities are more easily satisfied for
larger values of s or c and will always hold if c approaches 1. When
both inequalities are reversed, M(c) has a (dynamically stable)




For each of the three interaction contexts, Figure 1 illustrates
how the dynamics of cultural evolution (increase or decrease in the
frequency of pure strategy A) changes with the frequency of
conformist learning c. First, consider the extreme case c~0, at the
bottom of the three panels of Figure 1. Here, all learning occurs on
the basis of the payoffs in matrix G. In the social dilemma, A
(cooperate) is disfavoured by payoff-based learning, and cultural
evolution will lead to a decrease of the frequency of A (Figure 1A,
bottom arrow to the left) and convergence to the sole Nash
equilibrium p ~0. The coordination game has two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria (p ~0 and p ~1) that are separated by the
dynamically unstable mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (eq. 2). The
two arrows at the bottom of Figure 1B indicate that cultural
evolution will either lead to the fixation of A or to the fixation of B,
and that the outcome depends on initial conditions. In the evasion
game, the arrows at the bottom of Figure 1C indicate that the
system will converge to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (eq.
2), where A and B stably coexist. Next consider the other extreme
c~1, where all learning is conformism based, i.e. governed by
matrix K (top of the three panels in Figure 1). Now the expected
direction of change is identical for each of the three interaction
contexts: since K is a coordination game, the two pure strategies
are Nash equilibria and cultural evolution will either lead to the
fixation of A or to the fixation of B, depending on initial conditions
(top arrows in all three panels). Due to conformist learning, the
strategy that is initially more abundant is most likely to spread to
fixation.
For intermediate frequencies of conformism 0vcv1, we
observe a gradual shift between the two extreme cases c~0 and
c~1. In the social dilemma (Figure 1A), cooperation becomes a




swc{a): when a group mainly consists of cooperators,
conformist learning leads to the maintenance and fixation of this
most abundant strategy, despite of its payoff disadvantage. In the
coordination game (Figure 1B), the direction of change remains
qualitatively unchanged, but the unstable Nash equilibrium
separating the basins of attraction shifts from eq. (2) to p* = 0.5,
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the coordination game K.
In the evasion game (Figure 1C), A and B coexist at equilibrium when
learning is mainly based on payoffs (small c). High frequencies of
conformism c decrease the scope for this coexistence. When
conformism occurs at a sufficiently high frequency (moving
towards the top of the panel), the direction of expected change
is reversed, and the two monomorphic equilibria become stable.
3. A Stochastic Model for Cultural Evolution in Finite
Populations
The approach taken above provides an intuitive understanding
of the role of conformism in various types of interaction contexts.
However, it is not clear whether, and to what extent, the features
of conformism-based learning are captured by a coordination
game. We therefore developed a dynamic model for cultural
evolution where conformism is represented in a more mechanistic
way. Cultural evolution takes place in finite (and often small)
populations, where chance events may play an important role.
Accordingly, we consider a stochastic model for cultural evolution
in a finite population of fixed size n. Our model is event-based,
where an ‘event’ corresponds to a potential change in strategy by
one population member. In each time step (i.e. when an event
occurs) two individuals are chosen at random from the population,
and one of them is allowed to update its behavioural strategy (A or
B) by learning from the other. Updating occurs either through
conformist or payoff-based learning. For each state of the
population (i.e. each possible frequency of A-strategists), we
calculate the probability that an A-individual switches to B, and
that a B-individual switches to A. At the population level, each
such switch corresponds to a decrease or to an increase of the
number of A-individuals by one. Since we neglect the spontaneous
emergence of A- or B-strategists (the cultural equivalent of genetic
mutations), the stochastic process will eventually lead to an
Figure 1. Effect of conformism on the dynamics of cultural evolution when conformism-based learning is represented by a
coordination game. In three interaction contexts (social dilemma, coordination game, evasion game), colours and arrows indicate the expected
change in the frequency of behavioural strategy A for a given value of c, the relative frequency of conformism-based learning. In blue regions (arrows
to the right), A tends to increase; in red regions (arrows to the left), A tends to decrease. When all learning is conformism-based (c=1), cultural
evolution will either lead to the fixation of A or to the fixation of B, depending on which strategy was initially most frequent in the population. When
all learning is payoff-based (c= 0), strategy A (‘cooperation’) will disappear in the social dilemma; either A or B will go to fixation in the coordination
game; and A and B will stably coexist in the evasion game. Changing c from 0 to 1 leads to a smooth transition between these two scenarios.
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‘absorbing state’, where all individuals have adopted either of the
two strategies. To assess the effects of conformist learning on the
outcome of cultural evolution, we evaluate how our key parameter
c affects the fixation probability and waiting time to fixation for
each of the two behavioural strategies [28].
Let i be the number of A-strategists in the population, and let
Tzi and T
{
i denote the probability of gaining resp. losing one A-
individual. We model the switching dynamics by using pairwise
comparison (cf. [7]). When an event occurs, two individuals are
chosen at random from the population. A change in strategy can
only take place when these two individuals have opposite
strategies, which occurs with probability
i(n{i)
n(n{1)
. In state i,
switching from A to B (probability Tzi ) and from B to A







where C and P denote the probabilities of switching due to
conformist and payoff-based learning, respectively. For both forms
of social learning, we specify the switching probabilities as a
logistic function of the differences in payoffs (in case of payoff-
based learning) or frequencies (in case of conformist learning)
between strategies A and B. In state i, payoff-based switching from
B to A (Pzi ), and from A to B (P
{
i ) occurs with probabilities
Pzi ~Pr (B?ADi)~ 1z exp {bP:(pB(i){pA(i)ð Þ½ {1 ð6aÞ
P{i ~Pr (A?BDi)~ 1z exp {bP:(pA(i){pB(i)ð Þ½ {1 ð6bÞ
where pA(i) and pB(i) (see eq. (1)) refer to the payoffs of strategies
A and B in state i, respectively. Parameter bP quantifies the
strength and direction of the relation between the payoff difference
and the probability of switching. When bP = 0, payoff-based
learning is not biased in any particular direction, and is expected
to lead to dynamics similar to genetic drift. When bP is large,
payoff-based learning is strongly biased, favouring the spread of
strategies with the highest payoff (see Figure S1 for an illustration).
Conformist learning is represented in a similar way. In state i,
conformist switching occurs with probabilities
Czi ~Pr (B?ADi)~ 1z exp {bC :(fB(i){fA(i)ð Þ½ {1 ð7aÞ







refer to the relative frequencies of
strategies A and B, respectively. Parameter bC quantifies the
strength and direction of frequency-based social learning. When
bC = 0, such learning is not biased in any particular direction;
when bC is large, individuals are strongly inclined to adopt the
more frequent strategy in the population (see Figure S1).
Now we have specified Tz and T{ for all states i of the
population, we can use standard methods [28] to calculate fixation
probabilities Q and waiting times to fixation, for various initial
abundances of strategy A and B, as a function of the relative
frequency of conformism c. In File S1, section 2, we show how
explicit equations for the fixation probabilities can be derived on
the basis of a diffusion approximation of the stochastic model.
We assess the influence of the social learning rules on the
outcome of cultural evolution by comparing the fixation proba-
bilities Qk of A for a given initial abundance k of this strategy to that
of a ‘neutral’ process, where all switching occurs randomly. It is
well known that in the latter case Qk equals the initial frequency k/
n of A [28]. Panels A to C in Figure 2 illustrate the effects of
conformism on the fixation probability of A (cooperate) in a social
dilemma. When all switching occurs on the basis of payoffs (c= 0;
2A), cooperation is always disfavoured. Accordingly, fixation of A
is very unlikely unless the initial abundance of A is relatively large.
In fact, all fixation probabilities (red dots) are below the diagonal,
indicating that fixation of A is for all values of k less likely than
‘neutral’ updating. If social learning is partly based on conformism
(c= 0.25, 2B; c= 0.5, 2C), the fixation curve becomes more S-
shaped. Strategy A is increasingly likely to fixate when its initial
abundance is high, which agrees with our earlier findings
(Figure 1A).
In the coordination game without conformism (Figure 2D), payoff
differences near the A equilibrium are relatively small. This means
that switching from A to B can frequently occur, despite the fact
that strategy B yields lower payoffs. When the state of the group is
close to the unstable equilibrium, such stochastic events can tip the
group into the basin of attraction of B. As conformism increases in
frequency, the pure A equilibrium tends to be more stable; the
fixation probability rises above the diagonal k/n line when the
initial abundance of A is high (Figure 2E, F). This finding is again
in line with our earlier results (Figure 1B).
In the evasion game, payoff-based learning tends to favour the
spread of rare strategies. When conformist learning is absent
(c= 0, Figure 2G), fixation of B is often more likely. The
polymorphic equilibrium is located at n/3, and a group is
expected to spend most of the time close to this equilibrium.
Since this state is closer to the absorbing state where all individuals
play strategy B (relative to the other absorbing state, where all
individuals play strategy A), stochastic events will more likely lead
to fixation of B rather than fixation of A. When conformist
learning occurs at higher frequencies (Figure 2H, I), cultural
evolution tends to lead to fixation of the strategy that was more
abundant initially; again, this is in line with our earlier findings
(Figure 1C).
Conformism also affects the time it takes until a strategy fixates
in the evasion game (Figure 3). In an evasion game, each behavioural
strategy has higher payoff when rare. Accordingly, payoff-based
learning causes a group to spend a lot of time in polymorphic
states before it reaches one of the absorbing states. Increasing the
frequency c of conformist learning has two effects: first, the
frequency of payoff-based switching decreases, which hampers the
spread of rare strategies, thereby destabilising the coexistence
equilibrium. Second, conformist switching accelerates fixation,
because individuals preferentially adopt common strategies.
By breaking down polymorphism in the evasion game,
conformism affects the average payoffs of the group members. A
simple calculation shows that the average payoff at the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium (eq. 2) of an evasion game is given by
ad{bc
a{b{czd
. This can be considerably higher or lower than the
payoff a in case of fixation of behavioural strategy A or the payoff d
in case of fixation of B.
4. Evolution of Cooperation by Cultural Group Selection
Finally, we consider a multilevel scenario in which a metapop-
ulation is subdivided into m groups of size n. Within groups,
Conformism & the Cultural Evolution of Cooperation
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individuals face a social dilemma. As described above, payoff-
based learning within groups tends to disfavour cooperation. Once
in a while, individuals from two different groups are paired for
updating by comparing their payoffs. This reflects a scenario
where individuals occasionally copy behaviours from groups that
are performing well. It might be that individuals from other groups
are considered to be healthier, or have more wealth. We assume
that conformism does not play a role in between-group updating
(i.e. conformism is a strictly local social learning rule, allowing to
cope with local conditions). Further, in our model, updating
outside the group occurs at a much lower rate than within-group
updating: in between two outside-group updating events. This
implies that when a new strategy is newly introduced into a group,
this strategy will either have gone locally extinct, or reached
fixation before the next between-group event occurs. This
‘separation of time scales’ allows us to calculate the probability
of fixation of a ‘cooperative’ A strategy in the metapopulation, by
tracking the number of groups in the cooperative state. In each
time step of this group level process, the abundance of cooperator
groups can go up by one or go down by one, or can stay the same.
When two individuals from different groups are chosen from the
population, switching probabilities are defined analogously to
updating within groups. Switching probabilities depend on the
payoff difference between groups where cooperation is fixated and
groups where defection is fixated. This payoff difference is given by
a – d. For this between-group process, we again use logistic
functions to specify the relationship between payoff differences and
the probability that one defector switches to cooperation
Pr (B?A)G and the probability that one cooperator switches to
defection Pr (A?B)G .
Pr (B?A)G~ 1z exp {bG:(d{a)ð Þ½ {1 ð8aÞ
Pr (A?B)G~ 1z exp {bG:(a{d)ð Þ½ {1 ð8bÞ
Parameter bG specifies the relation between the payoff
difference of the members of the two different groups, and the
probability of switching. Since payoffs are higher in cooperative
groups than in defector groups (awd ), this process is expected to
lead to the spread of cooperation between groups. Let j be the
number of groups at the cooperative state, and let m–j be the
number of groups at the defector state. At state j, the probability of
gaining (Uzj ) or losing (U
{
j ) a cooperative group (by one defector
taking over a cooperative group, or vice versa, by one cooperator
taking over a defector group) can then be written as
Figure 2. Effects of conformism on the outcome of cultural evolution in a small group. Each panel shows the fixation probability of
strategy A as a function of its initial abundance (k) in a group of n= 30 individuals. Columns of panels correspond to three different frequencies c of
conformism. Symbols represent fixation probabilities from the exact stochastic model, and lines represent a diffusion approximation to these fixation
probabilities (see File S1, section 2). The diagonal dashed lines indicate the fixation probability of a strategy under random drift (Qk= k/n). Parameter
settings: bP=1 and bC=2; payoff matrices of the games as in Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068153.g002
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where 1 refers to the fixation probability of a single cooperator in
a group of defectors, and 1{ n{1 reflects the fixation probability
of a single defector in a group of cooperators (which is
complementary to the fixation probability of cooperation starting
from state n–1). Using the same techniques as before, we can
calculate the probability W1 that eventually all groups have
reached the cooperative state, given that we start out with 1 group
of cooperators. The product 1
:W1 then denotes the probability
that cooperation reaches fixation in the metapopulation, given that
we start out with one individual with the cooperative strategy.
Figure 4 gives an overview of the fixation probability of
cooperation in case of a single cooperator in a population
structured in m groups of fixed size n, under varying population
structures and varying frequencies of conformism c. When looking
at Figure 4B only, one might conclude that conformism has a
favourable effect on the cultural evolution of cooperation, since the
fixation probability of cooperation tends to increase with c. In our
view, however, this conclusion would be misleading. The
increasing scope for cooperation is not caused by conformism
per se, but rather by the associated decrease in frequency of
payoff-based learning. Decreased frequencies of payoff-based
learning weaken selection against cooperation within the group.
To assess the net effects of conformism, one therefore has to
compare the results of Figure 4B with a benchmark that takes this
weakening of payoff-based learning into consideration. This
benchmark is presented in Figure 4A where, with probability c,
individuals are imitating at random.
When the frequency of random switching within groups (as
opposed to payoff-based switching) increases, the scope for
cooperation increases (Fig. 4A, going from the left to the right in
the panel); within groups, the selection against cooperation is
weakened, whereas selection between groups is kept constant (see
[29] for a general analysis of how weakening within-group
selection can affect the scope for cooperation in group-structured
populations). Cooperation is favoured most, when the metapop-
ulation is structured into many small groups (Fig 4A going from
the bottom to the top of the panels). When groups are small, the
probability that a single cooperative strategy reaches fixation – in
spite of payoff-based learning disfavouring this strategy – is
relatively large. Once such fixation has happened, cooperation can
spread to other groups.
Comparing Figures 4A and 4B allows us to evaluate the net
effects of conformism on the cultural evolution of cooperation by
group selection. It is obvious that conformism hinders rather than
favours the evolution of cooperation: in the whole parameter
range, cooperation spreads more easily to fixation when conform-
ism-based updating is random (bC = 0) than when it has a strong
effect (bC = 5). Conformism hinders the evolution of cooperation
because cooperation cannot gain a foothold in new groups:
whenever a cooperator is introduced in a group of defectors, both
conformist and payoff-based learning press an individual to switch
back to defection.
Discussion
By means of a simple argument (where conformism was
approximated by a coordination game), we have shown that the
effect of conformism on cultural evolution strongly depends on the
interaction context. In case of a coordination game, conformism
merely affects the basins of attraction of the two pure-strategy
equilibria; in case of a social dilemma, conformism can turn
cooperation into a stable Nash equilibrium that coexists with an
equilibrium corresponding to pure defection; and in case of an
evasion game (such as a Hawk-Dove game or a Snowdrift game),
conformism can destroy a polymorphic equilibrium and induce
evolution to a pure-strategy state. These conclusions were
confirmed by a more mechanistic model for cultural evolution in
a finite population. Including cultural group selection in this model
strongly suggests that conformism tends to hinder, rather than
promote the cultural evolution of cooperation by group selection.
Our approach using two-by-two matrix games with pure
strategies is mathematically convenient, allowing to evaluate the
success of strategies under a range of conditions in a fast and fairly
straightforward manner. Also, this approach allows for deriving a
diffusion approximation of the stochastic process, leading to a
closed-form expression for fixation probabilities of a strategy under
any mixture of payoff-based and conformist learning (see section 2
of File S1). Individual-based simulations in which switching
between A and B is prone to errors – whose magnitudes are
inversely related to bP and bC – lead to very similar outcomes in
terms of fixation probabilities (not shown). This suggests that,
despite the simplicity of our model, our findings are robust with
respect to the way in which stochastic effects are introduced in the
switching dynamics.
Our analysis is, however, restricted to the situation where each
individual can only adopt a pure strategy. It remains unclear how
Figure 3. Effect of conformism on the persistence of behav-
ioural polymorphism in an evasion game. Lines represent the
expected number of updating events (i.e. the ‘waiting time’) until a
group fixates in either A or B, as a function of the frequency of
conformist updating c. The dashed blue line indicates waiting times
when all updating occurs randomly (bP= 0; bC= 0). The dashed red line
reflects waiting times when conformism occurs at rate c, and payoff-
based learning is absent (bP= 0; bC= 1; random updating occurs at
frequency 1–c). The solid blue line reflects waiting times when payoff-
based learning occurs at frequency 1–c, and conformism is absent
(bP= 1; bC= 0; random updating occurs at frequency c). The solid red
line represents waiting times in the full model, where payoff-based
learning is complemented by conformism at rate c (bP= 1; bC= 1).
Groups were of size n= 30 and initialised at the coexistence equilibrium
p= p* (10 A-individuals). Payoff matrix as in Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068153.g003
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conformism would influence cultural evolution when individuals
are characterised by a mixed strategy, which specifies a probability
distribution over the pure strategies. If such probabilistic
tendencies could be transmitted between individuals by social
learning, the dynamics of cultural evolution could be rather
different from the scenario considered here (see [30] for an
example). For instance, in an evasion game, all individuals could
fixate on the same mixed strategy 0v~pv1, supporting a
polymorphism where individuals make use of both pure strategies
in a probabilistic fashion. In contrast to the findings from our
analysis using two pure behaviours, conformism would be unlikely
to destabilise such a behavioural polymorphism. Note, however,
that the transmission of strategies by social learning depends on
the degree to which individuals can evaluate the strategies of their
peers. Whereas individuals might be able to evaluate the pure
strategies of their peers (and possibly imitate them accordingly), it
is not obvious that more complex (mixed) strategies readily
transmit between individuals.
Furthermore, we assume that individuals in the population all
use the same social learning strategy. Decision making experi-
ments show that individuals tend to vary considerably in their
social learning strategies (e.g. in the degree in which individuals
learn based on payoffs; [23]). Such individual variation in social
learning strategies can affect the course of cultural evolution. To
see this, consider a group in which some individuals typically learn
based on payoffs and others learn based on conformism. This
group may reach a stable behavioural polymorphism in an evasion
game: when conformists all perform a common strategy, payoff-
based learners can anticipate to that by adopting the strategy that
is rare. Such an emerging differentiation, in which conformist
learners perform one behaviour and payoff-based learners perform
another behaviour, cannot be attained by groups that are
homogeneous with respect to their social learning strategies. In
our model, individuals use a mixture of conformist and payoff-
based learning. As a consequence, a behavioural polymorphism is
destabilised by a number of consecutive conformist learning
events, potentially reducing the average payoffs of individuals in a
population.
Human social learning comes in many different forms, and
payoff-based and conformist learning only represent those forms
that have received most attention in the social learning literature.
Our analysis does not account for how other relevant forms of
social learning – such as following a leader or a teacher – would
affect the spread of behaviours within groups (see [31] for how
leadership can affect the cultural evolution of cooperation). Also,
the mechanism that spreads behaviours between groups consid-
ered our model, is only one way that this group-level mechanism
might work [15]. Alternative scenarios in which groups of
cooperators grow faster and split up when reaching a certain size
[17] are likely to lead to different outcomes of cultural evolution.
Such alternative forms of group-level selection can have different
consequences for evolutionary dynamics, and can interact with
within-group social learning in different ways. A more specific
simulation study [32], considering other population structures and
different forms and social learning and group selection, arrives at a
similar conclusion: conformism can promote the cultural evolution
of cooperation by group selection when groups can replace other
groups, whereas cooperation cannot evolve when cooperators
have to spread singly from group to group by a process of
‘infection’.
Our study leads to the conclusion that conformism has only a
marginal effect in the context of coordination games, that it tends
to erode the polymorphic equilibrium in evasion games, and that it
does not favour cooperation in a social dilemma. In other words,
our evaluation of the role of conformism is considerably less
favourable than the opinion of other scholars of cultural evolution
[3,8,11,14,15]. To put our conclusion into context, we would like
to stress that our analysis did not consider potential intrinsic
benefits of conformism. Two such benefits may be relevant in a
variety of situations. First, conformism could homogenise groups
with respect to a diversity of norms and habits, potentially
increasing social cohesion and facilitating the establishment of
trust, thus making it easier to resolve internal conflicts and to get
cooperation off the ground. Second, conformism could be a
beneficial strategy in environments with considerable spatial
variation in payoffs and/or behavioural norms. In a situation like
that, newcomers in a local group or environment could profit from
Figure 4. Effect of conformism on the evolution of cooperation by cultural group selection. Panels show fixation probability of
cooperation in a group-structured population where initially only a single individual cooperates. Within groups, payoff-based learning favours
defection, but cooperation can spread between groups by occasional learning outside of the local group, because individuals in cooperative groups
have higher payoffs. The number of groups m was varied between 10 and 200, in steps of 5, holding the metapopulation size constant at m n=1000.
The frequency of conformist updating was varied between 0 and 1, in steps of 0.01. In (A), bC is equal to zero, corresponding to random updating,
while the conformism-based updating has a strong effect (bC=1) in (B). Hence, panel (A) should mainly be viewed as a reference for panel (B). We
used an interpolation procedure (using the R-package ‘akima’) to smoothen the plots. Colours facilitate comparison to the fixation probability of a
selectively neutral mutant 1/(m?n). The payoff matrix coincides with that of the social dilemma game in Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068153.g004
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imitating local habits, thus quickly adopting locally superior
strategies or adapting to local behavioural equilibria. More
sophisticated models accounting for spatial variation and the
mechanisms underlying decision making in groups might therefore
arrive at a more positive judgement of the role of conformism for
the cultural evolution of social behaviour.
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